June 15-18
Instructors: Randall Calvert and Andrew Martin (both of Washington University in St. Louis)

Although most participants in the Summer Institute know the basics of rational choice theory and statistical analysis, it is necessary to cover some basic techniques from a standpoint that will prepare participants for the advanced seminars. Commentators on rational choice theory have asserted that such theories generate only point predictions, unsuitable for testing. The Foundations seminar presents important varieties of rational choice models, specifically spatial voting models and non-cooperative game theory, in a form that emphasizes the techniques by which these models can be used to generate testable implications through comparative statics analysis and the analysis of population variations in the parameter values. A key component of the Foundations seminar is to provide tools with which students can develop their own statistical models to test predictions derived from formal theories. Basic courses in statistical methods oftentimes give scant coverage to the following techniques fundamental to the Summer Institute's advanced seminars: maximum likelihood estimation, Bayesian inference, model specification for comparative statics predictions, model comparison, and simulation. Finally, software to be used in the subsequent advanced seminars is introduced.

• Syllabus
• Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2006. Monotone Comparative Statics for Models of Politics. (local, JSTOR)
• Cameron and Morton, 2002. Formal Theory Meets Data. (local)
• Casella and George, 1992. Explaining the Gibbs Sampler. (local, JSTOR)
• Chib and Greenberg, 1995. Understanding the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm. (local, JSTOR)
• Kass and Raftery, 1995. Bayes Factors. (local, JSTOR)
• Krehbiel, 1988. Spatial Models of Legislative Choice. (local, JSTOR)
• Kuhnert and Venables, 2005. An Introduction to R. (CRAN)
• Martin, for the Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology. Bayesian Analysis. (local)
• Raftery, 1995. Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research. (local, JSTOR)
• Simon and Blume, 1994. Mathematics for Economists, chapter 15, "Implicit Functions and Their Derivatives". (local)

• DeGroot and Schervish, 2002. Probability and Statistics. (Amazon)
• Gibbons, 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. (Amazon) (optional)
• Greenberg, 2007. Introduction to Bayesian Econometrics. (Amazon) [This book is also recommended for Rob Walker's seminar.]
• Morrow, 1994. Game Theory for Political Scientists. (Amazon) (optional)
• Osborne, 2003. An Introduction to Game Theory. (Amazon)

• Haptonstahl Lab R code:
  • Lab 1: Intro to R through estimating probit
  • Lab 2: MLE and simple programming

June 19-20
Instructor: Mark Fey (University of Rochester)

Much of the political science literature suffers from a disconnect between theory and the statistical techniques used to test or analyze theory. During this module, we will examine methods for explicity linking theory and statistical analysis, especially in a strategic context. Topic covered in this section will include random utility models (RUM), selection models, quantal response equilibrium (QRE), and structural econometric models of strategic interaction, including signaling.

• Syllabus
• Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 2002. The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies. (local, JSTOR)
• Bas, Signorino, and Walker, 2008. Statistical Backwards Induction: A Simple Method for Estimating Recursive Strategic Models. (local, Oxford Journals)
• Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt, 1999. Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?. (local, JSTOR)
• Carson, 2003. Strategic Interaction and Candidate Competition in U.S. House Elections: Empirical Applications of Probit and Strategic Probit Models. (local, Oxford Journals)
• Carson, 2005. Strategy, Selection, and Candidate Competition in U.S. House and Senate Elections. (local, EBSCO)
• Clark, Holt, Nordstrom, Reed, and Sieberg, 2008. Some Experimental Results for a Non-Equilibrium Bargaining Model of War. (local)
• Fey, McKelvey, and Palfrey, 1996. An Experimental Study of Constant-sum Centipede Games. (local)
• Gent, 2007. Strange Bedfellows: The Strategic Dynamics of Major Power Military Interventions. (local, Blackwell Synergy)
• Goeree and Holt, 2005. An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation. (local, Cambridge Journals)
• Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2005. Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium. (local, SpringerLink)
• Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey, 2000. An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules. (local, JSTOR)
• Haile, Hortacsu, and Kosenok, 2008 (2006 draft). On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium. (local)
• Leblang, 2003. To Devalue or to Defend: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy. (local, Blackwell Synergy)
• Levine and Palfrey, 2007. The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study. (local, Cambridge Journals)
• Lewis and Schultz, 2003. Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information. (local, Oxford Journals)
• McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995. Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games. (local, ScienceDirect)
• McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996. A Statistical Theory of Equilibrium in Games. (local)
• McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998. Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games. (local, SpringerLink)
• Signorino, 1999. Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict. (local, JSTOR)
• Signorino, 2003. Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models. (local, Oxford Journals)
• Signorino and Yilmaz, 2003. Strategic Misspecification in Regression Models. (local, JSTOR)
• Smith, 1999. Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation. (local, JSTOR)
• Wand, 2006. Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling. (local, Oxford Journals)

• Mark's Notes: day 1, day 2 statistical backward induction
• Mark's code: QRECorrespond, Estimating a strategic model from data, The fingers game Monte Carlo, war1800.dta, war1800 codebook

For over fifty years, the spatial model of voting has informed a great deal of rational choice scholarship on voting and decision making in legislative and judicial institutions throughout the world. It is no exaggeration to say that a great deal about what is known about voting in parliaments relies on the logic of the spatial model. The literature also suggests that voting in a well-defined issue space (of typically low dimensionality) explains a good deal of voting by the mass public. The spatial model has also spawned a tremendous amount of theoretical development. In general, we know that voting in multidimensional issue spaces is inherently unstable (McKelvey 1979, Schofield 1977), unless choice is constrained in some fashion, such as structure induced equilibrium (Shepsle 1979). This course seeks to better connect intense theoretical interest in spatial voting models with data analysis. How does one take voting data from a legislative body and estimate ideal points? How does one take a battery of issue questions on a survey and summarize the issue space? Given estimates of ideal points in such a space, how does one use them in other models? How does one go about computing equilibrium behavior from spatial models? In this course, cutting-edge methodological tools are taught that will allow students to (a) operationalize the spatial model in their own research; (b) use the spatial model in other statistical models of behavior; and (c) use computational approaches to compute equilibrium predictions of various sorts of formal models.

• Syllabus
• Albert, 1992. Bayesian Estimation of Normal Ogive Item Response Curves Using Gibbs Sampling. (local, JSTOR)
• Bailey, 2001. Ideal Point Estimation with a Small Number of Votes: A Random-Effects Approach. (local, Polmeth)
• Bianco, 2004. The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action. (local, Oxford Journals)
• Carroll, Lewis, Lo, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2009. Comparing NOMINATE and IDEAL: Points of difference and Monte Carlo tests. (local)
• Clinton and Jackman, 2009. To Simulate or NOMINATE? (local)
• Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, 2004a. The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data. (local, JSTOR)
• Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers, 2004b. "The Most Liberal Senator"? Analyzing and Interpreting Congressional Roll Calls. (local, Cambridge Journals)
• Clinton and Mierowitz, 2001. Agenda Constrained Legislator Ideal Points and the Spatial Voting Model. (local, Polmeth)
• Cox and Poole, 2002. On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999. (local, JSTOR)
• Heckman and Snyder, 1997. Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators. (local, JSTOR)
• Jackman, 2000a. Estimation and Inference Are Missing Data Problems: Unifying Social Science Statistics via Bayesian Simulation. (local, Polmeth)
• Jackman, 2000b. Estimation and Inference via Bayesian Simulation: An Introduction to Markov Chain Monte Carlo. (local, JSTOR)
• Jackman, 2001. Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian Simulation: Identification, Estimation, Inference, and Model Checking. (local, Polmeth)
• Jackman, 2009. Bayesian Approaches to Measurement. (local)
• Martin and Quinn, 2002. Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999. (local, Oxford journals)
• McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2001. The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress. (local, JSTOR)
• Nokken and Poole, 2004. Congressional Party Defection in American History. (local)
• Snyder and Groseclose, 2000. Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll-Call Voting. (local, JSTOR)

• R packages: wnominate, pscl, MCMCpack
• Bayesian software called from R: JAGS (all operating systems), WinBUGS (Windows only)

• Poole, 2005. Spatial Models of Parliamentary Voting. (Amazon)
• Poole and Rosenthal, 2000. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. (Amazon)

• Notes: day 1, factor analysis Venables and Ripley day 2, day 2 afternoon, day 2 2008 stuff, day 3
• Homework: (sweave file, pdf)
• Lab 4: QRE and JAGS in R

June 25-27, 29
Instructor: Rick Wilson (Rice University) and Catherine Eckel (University of Texas, Dallas)

This course develops the role and place of experiments in political science. Experiments are simply one of the tools available for use in the social sciences . they are not necessarily the only (or even first) tool to be used.

There are three goals for the course. First, we want to illustrate the connection between theory development and experimental design. Second, we want stress key components of experimental design (simplify, simplify, simplify). Finally, we want to provide a sense of the kinds of problems facing various types of experiments (from randomized control treatments to field experiments).

To learn about experimentation there is no substitute for doing. Of course, not everyone finds .doing. that engaging. We will offer optional sessions for those who are interested. You will be asked to write a short paragraph noting your interest and a possible topic. We will select from the applications. Depending on the number you will be split into small groups. Each group will be responsible for designing an experiment to test a question posed by the instructors. This will mean getting your hands dirty with conducting an experiment. To this end we will spend a lot of time outside classes (evening time and on Saturday) helping you refine your experiment. Time permitting an individual or group experiment will be run on the last day of class -- afterwards the class will offer a critique.

• Syllabus
• Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009. Who Is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-Analysis of 11 Field Experiments. (local)
• Ashley, Ball, and Eckel, 2005 working paper. Motives for Giving: A Reanalysis of Two Classic Public Goods Experiments. (local, UT Dallas)
• Bowers, 2009. Making Effects Manifest: How can we enhancing the sensitivity of experiments using what we (think we) know. (local)
• Bullock and Ha, 2009. Mediation Analysis is Harder than It Looks. (local)
• Dickson, 2009. Economics vs. Psychology Experiments: Stylization, Incentives, and Deception. (local)
• Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, and Lupia, 2006. The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science. (local, Cambridge)
• Druckman and Kam, 2009. Students as Experimental Participants: A Defense of the 'Narrow Data Base'. (local)
• Eckel and Grossman, 2001. Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games. (local)
• Eckel and Grossman, 2007 working paper. Encouraging Giving: Subsidies in the Field. (local, Walton)
• Eckel, Johnson, and Wilson, 2002. Fairness and Rejection in the Ultimatum Game. (local, Oxford)
• Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and Wright, 1992. Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market. (local, JSTOR)
• Gaines and Kuklinski, 2009. Treatment Effects. (local)
• Gerber, Green, and Larimer, 2008. Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment. (local, Cambridge)
• Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein, 2007. Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? (local, Cambridge)
• Haney, Herzberg, and Wilson, 1992. Advice and Consent: Unitary Actors, Advisory Models, and Experimental Tests. (local, JSTOR)
• Imai, King, and Stewart, 2008. Misunderstandings between experimentalists and observationalists about causal inference. (local)
• Isaac and Walker, 1988. Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. (local, JSTOR)
• Levine and Palfrey, 2007. The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study. (local, Cambridge Journals)
• McDermott, 2009. Internal and External Validity. (local)
• Miller, 2009. Legislative Voting and Cycling. (local)
• Morton, 1993. Incomplete Information and Ideological Explanations of Platform Divergence. (local, JSTOR)
• Sinclair, 2009. Design and Analysis of Experiments in Multi-level Populations. (local)
• Transue, Lee, and Aldrich, 2009. Treatment Spillover Effects across Survey Experiments. (local)
• Webster, 2007. Funding Experiments, Writing Proposals. (local)
• Whitt and Wilson, 2007. Public Goods in the Field: Katrina Evacuees in Houston. (local, EBSCO)
• Wilson and Eckel, 2006. Judging a Book by Its Cover: Beauty and Expectations in the Trust Game. (local)
• Wilson and Eckel, 2009. Trust and Social Exchange. (local)
• Wilson and Herzberg, 1987. Negative Decision Powers and Institutional Equilibrium: Experiments on Blocking Coalitions. (local, JSTOR)
• Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004. Prediction Markets. (local, JSTOR)

• Webster and Sell, 2007. Laboratory Experiments in the Social Sciences. (Amazon)

June 30 - July 2
Instructor: Jason Roberts (University of North Carolina)

Special Guest: Alan Wiseman (The Ohio State University)

In recent years, theoretical advances concerning legislative institutions, legislative parties, and the individual behavior of legislators have generated many methodological challenges. A central concern of the field is the development of appropriate tests of theories about the choice of formal and informal institutions. Closely related are theories of individual behavior in a strategic context. The seminar is designed to give intensive consideration of several problems at the intersection of theory and method.

The instructor for the seminar is Jason Roberts. Professor Roberts is an assistant professor specializing in American political institutions, with an emphasis on the U.S. Congress. He earned his B.S. in Political Science from the University of North Alabama (1998), his M.A. in Political Science from Purdue University (2000), and his Ph.D. from Washington University in St. Louis (2005). Prior to joining the faculty at UNC, Professor Roberts was an assistant professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Minnesota. His research interests include parties and procedures in the U.S. Congress and congressional elections. He is currently working on a project that explores the role of ballot type on the competitiveness of congressional elections in the United States.

• Syllabus
• Cameron, Cover, and Segal, 1990. Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model. (local, JSTOR)
• Clinton, 2007. Lawmaking and Roll Calls. (local, Blackwell Synergy)
• Cox and McCubbins, 2002. Agenda Power in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986. (local)
• Diermeier and Krehbiel, 2003. Institutionalism as a Methodology. (local, Sage)
• Herron and Wiseman, 2008. Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making: A Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois. (local, Cambridge)
• Johnson and Roberts, 2005. Pivotal Politics, Presidential Capital, and Supreme Court Nominations. (local, Johnson's site)
• Kramer, 1986. Political Science as Science. (local)
• Krehbiel, 1993. Where's the Party? (local, JSTOR)
• Krehbiel, 2007. Partisan Roll Rates in a Nonpartisan Legislature. (local, Oxford journals)
• Krehbiel and Meirowitz, 2002. Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to Recommit. (local, JSTOR)
• Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith, 2006. Who Wins? Party Effects in Legislative Voting. (local, Maltzman's site)
• Lynch and Madonna, 2009. Generating a recond: Assessing Congress's Decision to Record Votes. (local)
• Moraski and Shipan, 1999. The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices. (local, JSTOR)
• Patty, 2007. The House Discharge Procedure and Majoritarian Politics. (local, Cambridge)
• Primo, Binder, and Maltzman, 2008. Who Consents? Competing Pivots in Federal Judicial Selection. (local, Wiley)
• Riker, 1977. The Future of a Science of Politics. (local)
• Roberts, 2005. Minority Rights and Majority Power: Conditional Party Government and the Motion to Recommit in the House. (local, Roberts' site)
• Roberts, 2007. The Statistical Analysis Of Roll-Call Data: A Cautionary Tale. (local, Roberts' site)
• Rohde, 1994. Parties and Committees in the House: member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements. (local, JSTOR)
• Shepsle and Weingast, 1994. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. (local, JSTOR)
• Snyder, 1991. On Buying Legislatures. (local, Wiley)

• Cox and McCubbins, 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. (Amazon)
• Smith, 2007. Party Influence in Congress. (Amazon)

• Exercises: CQ Rules, Not-so-partisan House
• Notes: session 1, session 2, session 3, session 4

June 30 - July 2
Instructor: Robert W. Walker (Washington University in St. Louis)

Formal models have become more common in the political economy of international relations, but a notable disconnect remains between the theoretical and empirical worlds. In this seminar, we will discuss the unique challenges posed by data that are observed across both space and time through the lens of political economy models in international trade, finance, and conflict. We will construct, examine, and/or replicate dynamic models and models of transitions, measurement models, multiple imputation and other advanced techniques in cutting-edge applications of cross-national research using R.

Professor Robert Walker is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Center for Applied Statistics at Washington University in St. Louis specializing in international relations, international political economy, and political methodology. He is a 2005 Ph. D. in political science (studying under Randy Stone and Curt Signorino) from the University of Rochester and came to Washington University after stints in the Department of Political Science at Texas A & M University, the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and the Institute for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University. He teaches courses in international relations and political methodology in the Department of Political Science and courses in applied statistics and econometrics for the Center for Applied Statistics.

• Syllabus
• Bennett and Nordstrom, 2000. Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries. (local, JSTOR)
• Clark and Reed, 2005. The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution. (local, JSTOR)
• Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O'Halloran. Democratic Transitions. (local, JSTOR)
• Greene, 2003. Chapter 15: Simultaneous-Equations Models. (local)
• Lindsey, 2004. Chapter 5: Discrete-time Markov chains. (local)
• Park, 2007. Modeling Structural Changes using Bayesian Inference: Changepoint Analysis of Domestic Determinants of U.S. Presidents' Use of Force Abroad. (local)
• Spirling, 2007. Bayesian Approaches for Limited Dependent Variable Change Point Problems. (local, Oxford journals)
• Stratmann, 1992. The Effects of Logrolling on Congressional Voting. (local, JSTOR)
• Walker, 2003. Statistical Models for Policy Substitutes. (local)
• Walker, 2008 working paper. Credibility, Distributive Theory, and International Financial Policy: Exploring Models of Partisan Substitution in the OECD. (local)
• Walker, 2008 working paper. Democracy and Human Rights to Personal Integrity: History Matters. (local)
• Walker, 2008 working paper. Path, Phat, and State Dependence in Observation-driven Markov Models. (local)

• Greenberg, 2007. Introduction to Bayesian Econometrics. (Amazon) [This book is also recommended for the Foundations seminar.]

• Notes: day 1, Markov Models and Applications, On Observation-Driven Markov Models, day 3